Accepting his Nobel Peace Prize last Thursday, US President Barack Obama urged leaders to confront climate change. But will he deliver at the Climate Conference in Copenhagen? Caroline Muscat put the question to US Ambassador to Malta Douglas Kmiec.
His charm and persuasive abilities not only won Mr Obama the US Presidency, it drew back to America admiration from a world increasingly hostile towards the foreign policies of George W. Bush.
A global issue the former president ignored was climate change - a challenge the US Ambassador says President Obama has now taken on. But the road ahead is full of potholes.
"We've been slow to come to the table... but now we're unequivocal in our understanding that climate change is a problem that needs to be addressed thoroughly and equitably with respect to all of the nations in the world," says Mr Kmiec.
He adds the President is prepared to seek a legally binding agreement and will urge that upon the leaders present in Copenhagen. At a minimum, President Obama will seek immediate operational steps.
But the package the US has presented at Copenhagen was less than expected from the country that has the highest level of CO2 emissions per capita, and therefore the biggest contributor to climate change. Developing countries, which are already feeling the effects of global warming, say the US must carry its historical responsibility.
Mr Kmiec accepts the country's contribution to the problem: "Yes, the US is largely responsible for a great deal of greenhouse gases in the world that have led to this consequence. We have to own up to that."
Mr Obama offered "provisional" targets for emissions cuts - less than four per cent of what US emissions were in 1990, to be achieved by 2020. By comparison, within the same timeframe, the EU has committed to reducing its emissions by a minimum of 20 per cent, Britain alone pledging a 34 per cent cut, while Japan has promised a 25 per cent reduction.
Mr Kmiec thinks the US's long-term projections are comparable to those of other rich nations. The positions are much closer now than they were under the previous US administration, he says.
The US pledges have still to pass the test at the Senate to gain legislative force and the Senate remains deeply divided on the issue but the Ambassador is confident the US President's persuasive abilities will see it through.
He describes the US commitment on climate change as "realistic". The US has adopted a leadership position now but it is "also a position that recognises that we're not alone, that all of the developing nations have rather important and specific obligations that they need to meet, and the developed nations have an obligation to the developing world to mitigate the cost that we've already imposed on the environment".
Poor countries will be the first and hardest hit and the ones least able to cope with the effects of climate change, even if their contribution to the greenhouse gas emissions that cause global warming is negligible. But the promises by rich nations to fund efforts to adapt to climate change have only empty coffers to show. The poorest countries have received the least help from the rich, an analysis by The Guardian revealed.
And the US is being accused of not putting its money where its mouth is - the EU chief climate negotiator said in Copenhagen last Monday that an adaptation fund set up in 2001 had yet to receive a deposit from the US.
When this is put to the country's ambassador, he points to another US commitment to contribute to a $10 billion fund "to get things started". Whether the US will offer more depends on what others will do, Mr Kmiec adds.
"Much of this money will be borrowed from China, and if China is going to be on a path of focusing on economic growth alone, without consideration of environmental responsibility, that's a different question than if China itself is making commitments to environmental targets that are consistent with those the US is making."
China's counter argument is that its contribution to the problem is not equal to that of the US. But the US Ambassador insists China has to redirect some of its robust economic system towards a meaningful environmental target.
The US will give its proportion, Mr Kmiec says, while he admits the Iraq war was a drain on US resources, calling the $10-13 billion-a-month effort "massively wasted expenditure".
By comparison, "the expenditures involved (on climate change) are expenditures in building up, or at least maintaining, the quality of the human environment... that's quite the opposite, in my judgment, of the war on Iraq".
The change in attitude has been recognised internationally. Giving the Nobel Peace Prize to US President Obama, "for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples", has been seen as a means of boosting international climate talks.
It remains to be seen whether, in Copenhagen, the rhetoric will be replaced by the political will necessary to turn promises into action and prevent the human suffering that climate change is already inflicting.
Saturday, December 12, 2009
Businesspeople join the ranks of climate treaty proponents
From the legions of environmental Cassandras gathered here for international climate negotiations, an unlikely batch of advocates has emerged to champion a new global warming agreement: businesspeople.
Corporate leaders, the rarest of commodities at the first climate talks nearly two decades ago, have staked a claim to the title of biggest player in Copenhagen aside from the official negotiators.
They have blanketed the host Bella Center with company logos and glossy brochures touting business efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. An army of chief executives descended on the conference Friday to urge the assembled government officials to curb emissions and unleash a new wave of so-called clean energy investment. On Sunday, Coca-Cola will co-host a business round table here with the World Wildlife Fund.
Some of the executives, including major players in the utility and technology sectors, see massive profit potential in a worldwide shift away from fossil fuels and toward wind, solar and other low-emission energy sources.
Other companies say they are looking for uniformity in the increasingly global economy, where major markets, such as Europe, limit emissions but the United States and most of Asia do not.
Government leaders here say the increased corporate engagement has given new urgency to the negotiations and improved the chances of averting what scientists say could be the most catastrophic effects of climate change.
"This climate problem is too big, and the need for investment is too great, for government to do it alone," U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke told an overflow crowd Friday.
The big-business side to the talks has angered some climate activists, who decry "green capitalism" and call for massive wealth transfers from the richest nations to developing countries struggling to cope with climate change. One speech Friday at Klimaforum09, a parallel gathering of environmentalists, was titled "Global Warming: the Capitalist Catastrophe and the Eco-Socialist Alternative."
And though increasingly vocal, business leaders remain somewhat divided on climate policy, with groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urging "realism" on global efforts and opposing emission limits pending before Congress. Several economic studies funded by business groups have warned this year that emission limits would saddle U.S. companies with higher energy costs, stunting growth.
The chamber said in a news release Friday that its message to climate delegates is "businesses are committed to continuing to improve their environmental stewardship to address climate change . . . [but] any agreement must not undermine economic competitiveness or shed jobs."
When international leaders gathered for the first time in Rio de Janeiro in 1991 to discuss global warming, only a few corporate chiefs joined them, said Norine Kennedy, vice president for energy and environmental affairs at the U.S. Council for International Business. This week, hundreds and perhaps thousands of executives made the trip to Copenhagen.
"Our thinking has evolved as the treaty has evolved, as it has grown into new areas," said Kennedy, whose group represents 300 companies and is pushing for a more active business role in climate negotiations. "We see a larger and larger range of companies -- not just in terms of their sectors, but sizes and nationalities -- participating."
The shift stems from a combination of responsibility and opportunity, said several of the executives who swung through the conference to lobby for an agreement.
"What has changed in the last 10 years is that businesses have understood that to be sustainable is a must, and there is no future without concern for the environment," said Philippe Joubert, president of Paris-based Alstom Power, which operates power plants around the globe and recently opened the world's first pilot-scale plant for capturing and storing carbon dioxide emissions from coal.
Joubert and several other business leaders in Copenhagen said they want the climate talks to yield long-term rules that will set a price on greenhouse gas emissions.
The sentiment, oddly enough, echoes the consensus of oil and gas executives who gathered for a conference in Houston early this year.
"There's one point which the whole energy sector agrees upon, which is the need to make a decision on the future price of carbon," said Peter Brun, senior vice president for government relations at Vestas, the Danish wind company whose blue logo graces the giant turbine spinning outside the Bella Center.
Companies are also watching closely to see whether various pledges to reduce emissions could, at least in the short run, change the dynamics of global supply chains -- by, say, making energy sufficiently cheaper in Cambodia than in China to attract manufacturing across borders.
U.S. companies have raised the issues of energy costs and competitiveness with Locke, the Commerce secretary.
He sat Friday morning for an hourlong chat -- over water, no coffee -- with representatives of Intel, Microsoft, GE, FedEx and two dozen other companies. Locke said the conversation revolved around the opportunities of emission reduction.
If the world keeps cutting emissions and the United States does not follow suit, Locke said the executives told him, those companies "will establish plants in other countries to meet their changing [energy] needs."
Corporate leaders, the rarest of commodities at the first climate talks nearly two decades ago, have staked a claim to the title of biggest player in Copenhagen aside from the official negotiators.
They have blanketed the host Bella Center with company logos and glossy brochures touting business efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. An army of chief executives descended on the conference Friday to urge the assembled government officials to curb emissions and unleash a new wave of so-called clean energy investment. On Sunday, Coca-Cola will co-host a business round table here with the World Wildlife Fund.
Some of the executives, including major players in the utility and technology sectors, see massive profit potential in a worldwide shift away from fossil fuels and toward wind, solar and other low-emission energy sources.
Other companies say they are looking for uniformity in the increasingly global economy, where major markets, such as Europe, limit emissions but the United States and most of Asia do not.
Government leaders here say the increased corporate engagement has given new urgency to the negotiations and improved the chances of averting what scientists say could be the most catastrophic effects of climate change.
"This climate problem is too big, and the need for investment is too great, for government to do it alone," U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke told an overflow crowd Friday.
The big-business side to the talks has angered some climate activists, who decry "green capitalism" and call for massive wealth transfers from the richest nations to developing countries struggling to cope with climate change. One speech Friday at Klimaforum09, a parallel gathering of environmentalists, was titled "Global Warming: the Capitalist Catastrophe and the Eco-Socialist Alternative."
And though increasingly vocal, business leaders remain somewhat divided on climate policy, with groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urging "realism" on global efforts and opposing emission limits pending before Congress. Several economic studies funded by business groups have warned this year that emission limits would saddle U.S. companies with higher energy costs, stunting growth.
The chamber said in a news release Friday that its message to climate delegates is "businesses are committed to continuing to improve their environmental stewardship to address climate change . . . [but] any agreement must not undermine economic competitiveness or shed jobs."
When international leaders gathered for the first time in Rio de Janeiro in 1991 to discuss global warming, only a few corporate chiefs joined them, said Norine Kennedy, vice president for energy and environmental affairs at the U.S. Council for International Business. This week, hundreds and perhaps thousands of executives made the trip to Copenhagen.
"Our thinking has evolved as the treaty has evolved, as it has grown into new areas," said Kennedy, whose group represents 300 companies and is pushing for a more active business role in climate negotiations. "We see a larger and larger range of companies -- not just in terms of their sectors, but sizes and nationalities -- participating."
The shift stems from a combination of responsibility and opportunity, said several of the executives who swung through the conference to lobby for an agreement.
"What has changed in the last 10 years is that businesses have understood that to be sustainable is a must, and there is no future without concern for the environment," said Philippe Joubert, president of Paris-based Alstom Power, which operates power plants around the globe and recently opened the world's first pilot-scale plant for capturing and storing carbon dioxide emissions from coal.
Joubert and several other business leaders in Copenhagen said they want the climate talks to yield long-term rules that will set a price on greenhouse gas emissions.
The sentiment, oddly enough, echoes the consensus of oil and gas executives who gathered for a conference in Houston early this year.
"There's one point which the whole energy sector agrees upon, which is the need to make a decision on the future price of carbon," said Peter Brun, senior vice president for government relations at Vestas, the Danish wind company whose blue logo graces the giant turbine spinning outside the Bella Center.
Companies are also watching closely to see whether various pledges to reduce emissions could, at least in the short run, change the dynamics of global supply chains -- by, say, making energy sufficiently cheaper in Cambodia than in China to attract manufacturing across borders.
U.S. companies have raised the issues of energy costs and competitiveness with Locke, the Commerce secretary.
He sat Friday morning for an hourlong chat -- over water, no coffee -- with representatives of Intel, Microsoft, GE, FedEx and two dozen other companies. Locke said the conversation revolved around the opportunities of emission reduction.
If the world keeps cutting emissions and the United States does not follow suit, Locke said the executives told him, those companies "will establish plants in other countries to meet their changing [energy] needs."
Climate change protesters march in Copenhagen
Thousands of people are marching through Copenhagen as part of global protests to demand action from leaders at UN climate talks there.
Security has been stepped up along the four-mile (6km) route, with extra police on the streets and security fences put up around some buildings. Correspondents say the protest has been mostly peaceful although there have been some arrests.
Marches were also held in Australia, Hong Kong, Jakarta and the Philippines.
More than 50 protesters were arrested in Copenhagen following a smaller demonstration on Friday.
Organisers said they expected between 60,000 and 80,000 protesters from around the world to join Saturday's march across the city to the conference centre where where and ministers are meeting.
Danish police told AFP news agency they estimated some 30,000 people had gathered at a rally before the march.
The BBC's Matt McGrath in Copenhagen says the crowd is colourful, with some protesters arriving dressed as polar bears and others draped in blue and green to show their support for the planet.
Activists are arguing for an ambitious, legally binding agreement on emissions cuts to be signed by world leaders at the summit's conclusion at the end of next week.
"This is the right time to shout out and let leaders know this is serious business for us all. Lets hope they listen," Lin Che, a 28-year-old student from Taiwan, told Reuters news agency.
A number of famous figures were due to join the protest, among them Bollywood actor Rahul Bose, model and photographer Helena Christensen and former UN human rights commissioner Mary Robinson.
'Safe climate'
In Australia, where events were held as part of the country's fifth Walk Against Warming, the largest protest was held in Melbourne.
 |   |
Organisers said aerial photographs had been taken and would be sent to delegates at the talks in Copenhagen.
In Adelaide, activist James Dannenberg told state radio: "We want [world leaders] to bring home a treaty, we want them to stand by the Pacific and our neighbours there.
"And we want them to deliver and ensure a safe climate future for us all."
Thousands of demonstrators also gathered in front of Australia's parliament house in the capital, Canberra.
On Friday, European Union leaders agreed a three-year deal to pay 7.2bn euros (£6.5bn; $10.6bn) to help poorer nations cope with climate change.
But leaders of developing countries and some aid agencies described the sum offered by the EU as inadequate.
Meanwhile, in Copenhagen, officials released a draft text of a possible final deal in which rich countries are asked to raise their pledges on greenhouse gas emissions cuts.
Rich nations slam climate draft, thousands protest
Industrial countries criticized a draft global warming pact Saturday for not making stronger demands on major developing countries as tens of thousands of banner-waving protesters demanding "climate justice" marched toward the U.N. conference.
Initial reaction to the negotiating text submitted Friday underscored the split between the U.S.-led wealthy countries and countries still struggling to overcome poverty and catch up with the modern world.
The tightly focused document was meant to lay out the crunch themes for environment ministers to wrestle with as they prepare for a summit of some 110 heads of state and government at the end of next week.
U.S. delegate Jonathan Pershing said the draft failed to address the contentious issue of carbon emissions by emerging economies.
"The current draft didn't work in terms of where it is headed," Pershing said in the plenary, supported by the European Union, Japan and Norway.
But the EU also directed criticism at the U.S., insisting it could make greater commitments to push the talks forward without stretching the legislation pending in Congress. Both the U.S. and China should be legally bound to keep whatever promises they make, said Swedish Environment Minister Anders Carlgren.
Environment ministers started arriving in the Danish capital Saturday for informal talks before world leaders join the summit late next week.
On the chilly streets outside, police assigned extra squads to watch protesters marching toward the suburban conference center to demand that leaders act now to fight climate change.
Police estimated their numbers at 25,000, while organizers said as many as 100,000 had joined the march from downtown Copenhagen, waving banners that read "Nature doesn't compromise" and "Climate Justice Now."
Danish supermodel Helena Christensen was in the crowd. "They will be very bad politicians if they do not hear us by now," she said about the policy-makers negotiating in Copenhagen.
The protest was peaceful but police said they had detained 19 people, mainly for breaking Denmark's strict laws against carrying pocket knives or wearing masks during demonstrations.
Environmental activists also rallied in Asia to increase the pressure on climate negotiators in Copenhagen.
Thousands marched in a "Walk Against Warming" in major cities acrosss Australia and about 200 Filipino activists staged a festive rally in Manila to mark the Global Day of Action on climate change. Dozens of Indonesian environmental activists rallied in front of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta.
The draft distributed to the 192-nation conference set no firm figures on financing or on cutting greenhouse gas emissions.
It said all countries together should reduce emissions by a range of 50 percent to 95 percent by 2050, and rich countries should cut emissions by 25 to 40 percent by 2020, in both cases using 1990 as the baseline year.
The draft continues the system for industrial countries set up in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol by which they are legally bound to targets for emission reductions and face penalties if they fall short. It makes no similar requirements of developing countries like China and India, which have pledged to reduce the growth rate of emissions but reject the notion of turning those voluntary pledges into legal commitments.
So far, industrial nations' pledges to cut emissions have amounted to far less than the minimum.
The draft also left open the form of the agreement — whether it will be a legal document or a political declaration.
Ian Fry, the representative of the tiny Pacific island of Tuvalu, made an emotional appeal for the strongest format, one that would legally bind all nations to commitments to control carbon emissions.
"I woke up this morning crying, and that's not easy for a grown man to admit," Fry said, choking as he spoke in the plenary crowded with hundreds of delegates. "The fate of my country rests in your hands."
European Union leaders announced in Brussels this week after two days of tough talks that they would commit $3.6 billion (euro2.4 billion) a year until 2012 to a short-term fund for poor countries. Most of this money came from Britain, France and Germany. Many cash-strapped former East bloc countries balked at donating but eventually all gave at least a token amount to preserve the 27-nation bloc's unity.
Still unknown is how much the wealthier nations, such as the U.S. and Japan, will contribute
Initial reaction to the negotiating text submitted Friday underscored the split between the U.S.-led wealthy countries and countries still struggling to overcome poverty and catch up with the modern world.
The tightly focused document was meant to lay out the crunch themes for environment ministers to wrestle with as they prepare for a summit of some 110 heads of state and government at the end of next week.
U.S. delegate Jonathan Pershing said the draft failed to address the contentious issue of carbon emissions by emerging economies.
"The current draft didn't work in terms of where it is headed," Pershing said in the plenary, supported by the European Union, Japan and Norway.
But the EU also directed criticism at the U.S., insisting it could make greater commitments to push the talks forward without stretching the legislation pending in Congress. Both the U.S. and China should be legally bound to keep whatever promises they make, said Swedish Environment Minister Anders Carlgren.
Environment ministers started arriving in the Danish capital Saturday for informal talks before world leaders join the summit late next week.
On the chilly streets outside, police assigned extra squads to watch protesters marching toward the suburban conference center to demand that leaders act now to fight climate change.
Police estimated their numbers at 25,000, while organizers said as many as 100,000 had joined the march from downtown Copenhagen, waving banners that read "Nature doesn't compromise" and "Climate Justice Now."
Danish supermodel Helena Christensen was in the crowd. "They will be very bad politicians if they do not hear us by now," she said about the policy-makers negotiating in Copenhagen.
The protest was peaceful but police said they had detained 19 people, mainly for breaking Denmark's strict laws against carrying pocket knives or wearing masks during demonstrations.
Environmental activists also rallied in Asia to increase the pressure on climate negotiators in Copenhagen.
Thousands marched in a "Walk Against Warming" in major cities acrosss Australia and about 200 Filipino activists staged a festive rally in Manila to mark the Global Day of Action on climate change. Dozens of Indonesian environmental activists rallied in front of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta.
The draft distributed to the 192-nation conference set no firm figures on financing or on cutting greenhouse gas emissions.
It said all countries together should reduce emissions by a range of 50 percent to 95 percent by 2050, and rich countries should cut emissions by 25 to 40 percent by 2020, in both cases using 1990 as the baseline year.
The draft continues the system for industrial countries set up in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol by which they are legally bound to targets for emission reductions and face penalties if they fall short. It makes no similar requirements of developing countries like China and India, which have pledged to reduce the growth rate of emissions but reject the notion of turning those voluntary pledges into legal commitments.
So far, industrial nations' pledges to cut emissions have amounted to far less than the minimum.
The draft also left open the form of the agreement — whether it will be a legal document or a political declaration.
Ian Fry, the representative of the tiny Pacific island of Tuvalu, made an emotional appeal for the strongest format, one that would legally bind all nations to commitments to control carbon emissions.
"I woke up this morning crying, and that's not easy for a grown man to admit," Fry said, choking as he spoke in the plenary crowded with hundreds of delegates. "The fate of my country rests in your hands."
European Union leaders announced in Brussels this week after two days of tough talks that they would commit $3.6 billion (euro2.4 billion) a year until 2012 to a short-term fund for poor countries. Most of this money came from Britain, France and Germany. Many cash-strapped former East bloc countries balked at donating but eventually all gave at least a token amount to preserve the 27-nation bloc's unity.
Still unknown is how much the wealthier nations, such as the U.S. and Japan, will contribute
Friday, December 11, 2009
Action and ambition for a global deal in Copenhagen
Action and ambition for a global deal in
Copenhagen
Nicholas Stern
6th December 2009
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy
Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and
the Environment
In collaboration with the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Policy Update
The Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy (CCCEP) was
established by the University of Leeds and the London School of Economics
and Political Science in 2008 to advance public and private action on climate
change through innovative, rigorous research. The Centre is funded by the UK
Economic and Social Research Council and has five inter-linked research
programmes:
1. Developing climate science and economics
2. Climate change governance for a new global deal
3. Adaptation to climate change and human development
4. Governments, markets and climate change mitigation
5. The Munich Re Programme - Evaluating the economics of climate risks
and opportunities in the insurance sector
More information about the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy
can be found at: http://www.cccep.ac.uk.
The Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and the
Environment was established by the London School of Economics and
Political Science in 2008 to bring together international expertise on
economics, finance, geography, the environment, international development
and political economy to create a world-leading centre for policy-relevant
research and training in climate change and the environment. The Institute is
funded by The Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment.,
and has five research programmes:
1. Use of climate science in decision-making
2. Mitigation of climate change (including the roles of carbon markets and
low-carbon technologies)
3. Impacts of, and adaptation to, climate change, and its effects on
development
4. Governance of climate change
5. Management of forests and ecosystems
More information about the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change
and the Environment can be found at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/grantham/.
Action and Ambition for a Global Deal in Copenhagen1
Summary:
This paper sets out an assessment of the latest national positions regarding
emission reduction targets and actions going into the forthcoming negotiations
in Copenhagen. These targets and intentions are quantified and translated
into global emissions to give an understanding of how close we are to a
possible agreement consistent with keeping temperature increase below 2°C.
Recent work on the latest science and economics of 2°C shows that global
emissions should be around 44Gt2 carbon dioxide equivalents in 2020 to be
consistent with a 50-50 chance of keeping temperature increase below 2°C.
This is in line with the earlier work that underpins the IPCC conclusions.
Existing proposals from developed and developing countries, if delivered,
constitute a big step towards a path consistent with the 2°C goal. Taking
countries’ highest intentions would take the world to around 46Gt in 2020 a
gap of 2Gt, which may be around 80% of the way from business as usual,
depending on the interpretation of business as usual.
However, this analysis relies on the following key assumptions:
• Countries moving to or standing by their high intentions which may require
the satisfaction of stipulated conditions concerning action from others
• Providing adequate finance and other support for high intentions in
developing countries such as Indonesia and Brazil; this should not count
offset finance, as this risks double counting, or with offset finance but
matched with more stringent targets.
• That surplus emissions allowances from previous commitment periods do
not weaken mitigation effort
• A system of rules for how to account for the emissions released and
absorbed in the LULUCF sector (Land Use, Land Use Change and
Forestry) to ensure the environmental integrity of emission targets
But with the right kind of collaborative spirit it is clearly possible for countries
to get to together so that the necessary strong commitments can be made.
Analysing these intentions often relies on relating targets and actions to a
concept of business as usual (BAU). BAU is a concept that is difficult to pin
down because a group of polices that have been indicated or announced may
or may not be included in BAU; further it can depend on what assumptions are
made about structural change, for example how rapidly services grow as a
share of the economy. Where an analyst uses a higher estimate of business
as usual this can lead to a larger estimated gap. It also depends on what is
included in these estimates and with significant uncertainty around current
and future non-energy emissions there is scope for alternative estimates. We
1 This is a work in progress incorporating announcements as of 4th December and subject to
revision as many country plans are under review and could to change or be clarified, so this
assessment will be subject to change. The interpretation of the targets are the authors. Many
thanks to Chris Taylor and colleagues at the Grantham Research Institute, LSE and at UNEP
for their helpful comments and guidance. Comments are very welcome.
2 Gigatonne - which is a billion tonnes
suggest an uncertainty range of around -1Gt to +3Gt3 around our estimate of
the gap.
On the basis of the above calculations the gap would be 2Gt (range from 1Gt
to 5Gt). Filling the remaining 2Gt gap would require greater ambition
(especially from larger emitters in order to deliver required reductions), ideally
combined with a contribution to emission reductions from international aviation
and maritime sectors which is currently excluded from existing commitments,
and greater efforts on REDD.
While there is much to do, we should not downplay how close we are to
delivering an effective and credible global agreement.
What is a ‘climate responsible’ trajectory?
Research4 by the LSE Grantham Research Institute explored a range of
trajectories that result in a reasonable chance of keeping temperature
increases below 2°C and considered the economic implications. Annex 1
provides a more detailed summary. The scientific conclusions are consistent
with the ranges in the IPCC. Since it is cumulative emissions over time that
matter most to eventual temperature increase, less early action means more
costly and sharper reductions to lower emission levels in the future.
The analysis concludes that emissions should be around 44Gt in 2020,
representing a sensible “climate responsible” target from a cost and risk
management perspective5. Lower emissions would also be consistent with
2°C but require very strong action over the next decade. Higher emissions
could still reach the same climate outcomes but require more drastic action
after 2020 that would be considerably more expensive and may not be
feasible. Current emissions are around 47Gt in 2010 (this would be close to
50Gt if it were not for the slowdown).
But how do current intentions collectively compare to 44Gt in 2020? The next
section outlines and quantifies the commitments, targets, proposals and
intentions of the major emitters6. It does not cover the plans for other
countries although many of them are ambitious relative to their size such as
Norway’s commitment to reduce emissions by 40% on 1990 levels and the
Maldives pledge to be carbon neutral by 2019.
3 This range is skewed to reflect the fact that we are unable to include peat emissions which
could currently be around 1Gt to 1.5Gt. Other studies evaluating current intentions can be
found at http://www.climateactiontracker.org/ and http://www.project-catalyst.info/
4 Paper released on 1st December by Dr Ranger and Dr Bowen on the Grantham Research
Institute website.http://www2.lse.ac.uk/granthamInstitute/pdf/bowenRangerPolicyBrief.pdf
5 There is not as yet wide political agreement that such a level is an appropriate benchmark
for a 2°C trajectory. However, in our view this represents an appropriate level for this analysis.
6 At the time of writing the countries in the more detailed tables are all in the top 20 carbon
dioxide emitters and collectively account for more than 80% of global emissions Emission
commitments excluded from the detailed tables are included in the overall numbers for
developed countries..
Current developed country proposals
Table 1: Annex I - developed countries
Country Description Summary for
2020 emissions
US Recent announcement that the US is prepared to table
an emissions commitment of 17% below 2005 levels
(3% below 19907). Longer-term goals set out a pathway
to an 83% below 2005 levels (80% reduction below
1990 levels) in 2050. Earlier draft legislation had
additional provisions to buy 0.7Gt of forestry credits in
2020 and around $3bn for technology and adaptation.
Currently emissions are 15% above 1990 levels.
3% below 1990
levels
Plus support for
reduced
deforestation?
EU Committed to reduce emissions to 20% below 1990
levels (currently 12.5% below) and 30% below 1990
levels as part of an ambitious global agreement.
Indicated willingness to pay its share of significant
finance flows from developed to developing countries
including public finance that could support additional
mitigation (including REDD).
20 to 30% below
1990 levels.
Public finance for
additional
mitigation
elsewhere
Japan Japan has committed to reduce emissions by 25%
below 1990 levels as part of an effective and
comprehensive agreement at COP 15.
25% below 1990
levels
Russian
Federation
Russian Federation committed to reduce emissions by
up to 25% below 1990 levels. Russian emissions were
36% below 1990 levels in 2007.
25% below 1990
levels
Canada Committed to reduce emissions by 20% relative to 2006
levels (equivalent to 3% below 1990)
3% below 1990
levels
Australia Australia proposed to reduce its emissions to 5-25%
below 2000 levels (15% to 33% below 1990 levels).
Adoption of the most ambitious target of 25% depends
on five conditions being met8. If not all the conditions are
met but there is an international agreement with all
major emitters the target would be -15%.
15% to 33%
below 1990
levels
Based on authors understanding of existing positions
Some of the intentions have not yet been legislated as national commitments
or action plans and others are reliant on particular conditions being met (e.g.
on international agreement). Direct quantification of developed country targets
is often straightforward as they are related to fixed historical emissions levels
(although they tend to get complicated over how emissions and emissions
reductions in land use change, afforestation, reforestation and land
degradation will affect the target and the degree to which it is intended that
international offset credits play a role).
For Tables 1 and 2 we have used emissions excluding LULUCF. In 2005
UNFCCC data suggests that Annex I countries provided a net sink of around
1.8Gt which would further reduce emissions so excluding it from this analysis
7 The 3% figure is based on a 17% reduction of emissions excluding LULUCF. The target was
announced based on emissions including LULUCF which would be 5.5% on 1990 emission
including LULUCF. Depending on the accounting rules this is could be equivalent to about a
5% reduction on 1990 emission excluding LULUCF.
8 http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/australia010609.pdf reductions on 1990
levels based on recently revised UNFCCC 1990 data and including LULUCF in line with
Australian targets
ignores the potential additional contribution they could make. It is excluded as
its treatment is dependent in international rules which have yet to be
determined. If it is used to meet targets it could reduce mitigation effort from
other sources and possibly increasing emission levels beyond the totals in the
next table. The table also excludes the potential for surplus credits from
previous commitment periods being used to meet targets which, if permitted,
could increase emissions in 2020.
Table 2: Current developed country proposals in 2020 (Gt CO2e)
Low intentions
2020 Emissions
(Gt) High intentions
2020 Emissions
(Gt)
US -17% on 2005 5.9 -17% on 2005 5.9
EU -20% on 1990 4.5 -30% on 1990 3.9
Japan -25% on 1990 1.0 -25% on 1990 1.0
Other developed countries 5.1 5.0
Developed country total 16.3 15.7
So current proposals would take developed countries to around 16Gt (and a
significant deviation from business as usual) and around 16% below 1990
levels. It is not possible to determine whether such commitments are enough
to take the world onto a 44Gt pathway until it is combined with developing
country actions; and it would remain open to debate whether it represents an
equitable share of the mitigation effort.
Targets and actions announced by developing countries
Table 3: Non-Annex I - developing countries
Country Description 2020 Summary
China Announced policies such as the energy intensity
target in the current 5 year plan and 2020 targets
for renewable and nuclear are set to reduce
emissions by around 10% below business as
usual (BAU). Recent announcement to set
carbon intensity of output to 40% to 45% below
2005 levels by 2020.
Carbon intensity
target and
existing domestic
policies lead to a
10% reduction on
2020 BAU
India Plans and policies outlined in National Plan and
in the 11th 5 year plan. Many are not quantified
but domestic policy initiatives with policy targets
collectively amount to a deviation from BAU of at
least 7%. Recent announcement to set carbon
intensity of output to 20% to 25% below 2005
levels by 2020.
Carbon intensity
target and
existing domestic
policies lead to at
least 7%
reduction on
2020 BAU
Brazil Announced target reduce its emissions by 36%
to 39% on 2020 BAU levels (roughly 1/3 below
1990 levels) conditional on external financing
and including significant REDD. Level of finance
requirements not yet clear so not certain what is
own action and what requires support. Had
previously announced a National Action Plan
that would reduce emissions by about 25%
below BAU.
36% to 39%
below 2020 BAU
levels with
external financial
support
Indonesia Pledged to reduce emissions below BAU by 26%
unilaterally and 41% below with international
26% below 2020
BAU unilateral,
support (around 1/6 to 1/3 below 1990 levels).
The 26% target is to be achieved primarily
through reduced emissions from deforestation
and land use change.
41% below
conditional
South Korea Unilateral pledge to reduce emissions by 30%
below their defined BAU (around 4% below 2005
levels).
30% below 2020
BAU
South Africa Existing domestic policies expected to reduce
emissions by about 10% from BAU. Government
intention to follow a peak and decline scenario
which allows for the initial build-up of base-load
capacity, would equate to around 20% below
BAU levels.
10% below 2020
BAU
Mexico National plan (PECC) sets out detailed policies
up to 2012 that are being enacted which are
likely to reduce emission by around 5% in 2020
relative to BAU. Overall strategy to reduce
emissions by 50% by 2050 implies emission
being around 20% below BAU in 2020.
5% below 2020
BAU but longer
term goals imply
greater ambition
Note: Based on authors understanding of existing positions. Where countries have
announced both a set of policies and a carbon intensity (or other) reductions we have taken
the bigger of the two calculations in terms of reductions. This is of particular relevance to
China and India where the announced intensity targets appear to imply lower than the
reductions that would follow from announced policies (perhaps because there is some
inherent caution on the implementation of the policies).
Again some of the intentions have not yet been legislated as national targets
or action plans and others are reliant on certain conditions being met. This is
particularly the case for Indonesia and Brazil where delivering on the high
ambition targets is dependent on international support. As countries have
expanded their scale of ambition they are understandably looking again at
what support would be required. This highlights the importance of developed
countries delivering substantial financial resources to support the willingness
of some developing countries to implement ambitious policies.
Targets in developing countries pose additional challenges for quantification.
The targets are usually related to business as usual9 (BAU) – the path
emissions would be likely to follow without further policy action. Reductions
are therefore dependent on what assumptions are made about the BAU path.
This is easier where countries specify reductions against a specified BAU but
where they do not there can be significant variations in BAU estimates from
9 There remains considerable uncertainty around developing country emissions and, in
particular those relating to forestry and land use. The uncertainty in developed country BAU is
much lower as targets are generally related to fixed historical points. Developing countries
would commit to actions relative to a definition of business as usual. They would be
committing to actions not the emission levels set out in this numerical exercise so this would
introduce some uncertainty in climate outcomes were significant revisions in BAU to occur.
Moreover, business as usual is a slippery concept that is inherently subjective and subject to
significant uncertainties. What actions and commitments are included in BAU over time is
subjective. It is easier where countries have specified actions against a defined path but other
sources of estimates of BAU (largely the International Energy Agency) are used for our
calculations where this is not possible. It is better, given its subjectivity, to avoid using BAU
where possible. Indeed by combining growth rates, emissions per unit of output and
associated mitigation actions, BAU becomes redundant.
different sources. Higher BAU estimates due to stronger economic growth,
energy intensity or LULUCF sources would affect to estimates of emission
outcomes.
The quantification of reductions in this analysis is predicated on the support
provided action to reach higher targets (e.g. Brazil and Indonesia) being
accomplished through public finance from developed countries, not carbon
market offsets (which would count towards the developed country target) in
order to avoid double counting. Offsets by developed countries would shift the
balance of actual emissions and would imply finance flows to developing
countries. We must be transparent about ‘adding up’ and avoid double
counting, and thus estimate actual emissions after offsets; emissions in
country A which buys the offsets are increased relative to the numbers here
and emissions in country B which receives the finance flow are lowered (sells
the offset). Nevertheless offsets through the carbon market can be a win-win
for both developed and developing countries10.
As a first step Table 4 considers only India and China’s domestic policy
targets and assumes other developing countries follow a BAU trajectory.
Table 4: Developing country policies (China and India) and the expected
emission reductions11 See note for Table 3
Country Current policies
Savings in 2020
(GT CO2e)
Emissions in
2020 (GT CO2e)
Energy Intensity target 20% by 2010 0.5
Renewable energy 15% by 2020 0.5
Nuclear target 75GW by 2020 0.3
Total 11.2
Solar Mission 20GW by 2020 0.03
Renewable electricity 15% by 2020 0.07
Increasing forest cover 6 million hectares by 2017 0.07
Total 3.6
Other developing countries 16.7
International aviation and maritime 1.3
Total developing countries and international aviation and maritime 32.8
China
India
Carbon intensity targets pose additional challenges to quantification. Growth
rates are already a key determinant in BAU but directly affect the total
10 They can provide private finance to foster both the transformation of the energy system in
developing countries and the transfer of and domestic development of low-carbon
technologies; and they can reduce global mitigation costs.
11 Estimates in this table are sensitive to uncertainty in business as usual. These estimates
are based on assumptions on developing country forestry and energy emissions that are
subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Changes in these levels will affect the volume of
emission reductions that would need to be delivered. Anthropogenic emissions from peat are
excluded and incorporating these would add up to 1.5Gt globally. This would provide an
additional argument to go further in mitigation action including specific action to reduce
emissions from peat to take advantage of these additional mitigation opportunities. Recent
revisions in deforestation estimates may offset incorporating peat emissions to an extent.
There should also be increased efforts to clarify current and hence likely future emissions to
reduce this uncertainty.
emissions implied by carbon intensity targets. In this analysis it was assumed
that China continued strong economic growth of over 8% but that existing
domestic policies (emissions intensity target up to 2010 and 2020 nuclear and
renewable targets) led to significant emission reductions on BAU. Our
analysis suggests this leads to lower emissions than implied by the emission
intensity target and hence it is the domestic targets that ‘bite’12 for the purpose
of these calculations. The same also applies to India’s emission intensity
target.
The following graph provides estimates of some of the emission reductions
from some of the targets proposed recently by Indonesia, Brazil, and South
Korea along with those implicit in South African modelling13. Thus the
reductions are additional to those in Table 4. In the case of Brazil they reflect
a crude estimation of the share of the target that is “national effort” and the
share that is conditional on additional support14.
If these actions and targets were fully supported allowing Brazil and Indonesia
to go to the top end of their targets but without using offset finance (which
would lead to double counting) then they would deliver an additional 2.6Gt
mitigation relative to Table 4 taking the other developing countries down to
14.2Gt and the total developing country emissions to 28.9Gt.
12 This would imply China did not abandon or loosen existing domestic policies and targets. If
economic growth was not as strong (i.e. below 6.5% per annum) then the emission intensity target
would start to reduce emissions further. If growth was significantly stronger than has been assumed
then this would push emissions up.
13 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS). Strategic Options for South Africa. Pretoria, South
Africa: Development of Environment Affaires and Tourism (2007)
14 As reflected by the graded shading and arrow in the figure below.
Where could these commitments, actions and targets take the world?
These tables show that all the major emitters have shown a willingness to
take significant action to reduce their emissions from business as usual
(BAU), whilst specific targets reflect a diverse range of national
circumstances. The intentions and actions embodied in Tables 2, 4 and from
recent developing country intentions are shown in Table 5 and show that high
intentions imply global emissions of just under 46Gt in 2020. This figure
is derived from the high end of the developed country commitments and
reductions achieved in developing countries with adequate international
financial support (if not using offset credits). The gap relative to 44Gt in 2020
would be around 2Gt15 (or a range of 1Gt to 5Gt). This already represents a
saving of around 8Gt on BAU16 so existing announcements would, if
delivered, achieve 80% of the reductions that are required.
Table 5: Total emissions from high intentions
2020 total from
high intentions
Developed country total 15.7Gt
Developing countries total 28.9Gt
International aviation and maritime 1.3Gt
Global total 46Gt
Gap 2Gt
However, these estimates rely on countries being satisfied that the conditions
are met for them to reach high targets and, in particular, adequate support
being provided to developing countries to facilitate their highest intentions.
Strong financial and technical support is essential to deliver these
targets. Furthermore it assumes that double counting through offsets is
avoided and that there is no weakening of new targets through lax accounting
rules for the LULUCF or surplus emissions allowances from the Kyoto period.
Failure on these, or countries resorting to low intentions has the potential to
significantly reduce the overall level of ambition calculated here. Clearly there
are significant challenges involved in delivering such reductions but none of
these are insurmountable and the required reductions could probably be
achieved using current technologies and carefully designed policies.
Technological progress would open up a further range of options.
Filling the gap
There are many ways in which the remaining gap could be filled and it is
essentially a political question to be addressed by countries during the
upcoming COP negotiations. The main options include some combination of:
• Developed countries increasing their high intentions.
• Other developing countries, especially larger emitters (given their size),
coming forward with plans for further domestic reductions as part of a
15 Or 3.5Gt if anthropogenic peat emissions continue at current levels to 2020
16 Our business as usual (excluding peat) is 54Gt in 2020
global deal and/or an indication of what they could do with international
support.
• Additional reductions in deforestation and other sources
• Incorporating international emissions from aviation and maritime to
deliver additional mitigation17.
Conclusions
This analysis shows that existing developed and developing country targets
and plans can take us most of the way to global emissions of 44Gt in 2020,
which is consistent with a 2°C trajectory. This assumes that developed
countries provide finance to support mitigation in developing countries that is
not counted as an offset against their mitigation goals (or represents part of
more ambitious goals). It shows that agreeing actions consistent with a 2°C
trajectory is feasible in Copenhagen.
This analysis relies on two key assumptions if such a positive vision is to
come to fruition. First it assumes that countries are at least able to fully deliver
on their stated high intentions and that some of them increase their intentions
further. Given that many of these intentions are already ambitious the effort
required to deliver should not be understated. Starting strongly on a lowcarbon
path is surely justified relative to the dire consequences of the
alternative, but requires a radical restructuring of how our economies work in
the coming decades. Secondly it requires countries to come together and
agree to deliver on their intentions and provide the appropriate support to
each other to ensure that in Copenhagen we enshrine these intentions as part
of an international agreement.
Uncertainty in business as usual (BAU) could lead to larger estimates of the
‘gap’ if a higher BAU is included or estimates from peat and other LULUCF
sources are thought to be higher. This leads us to suggest a range for the gap
of 1Gt to 5Gt.
The countries of the world have made considerable progress towards
securing a global agreement that delivers emission reductions which are
commensurate with the scale of the challenge. All of the major economies
understand that every country must act. We must now work together to
cement and increase the indicative ambition shown thus far and turn this into
a solid set of actions and commitments that will fill the gap and deliver the
scale of reductions that are required to keep the temperature increase to
below 2°C. The people and politicians of the world, community by community,
nation by nation, will now determine whether we can create and sustain the
international vision, commitment and collaboration which will allow us to seize
this historic special opportunity and to rise to the challenge of a planet in peril.
17 For example, if we set a target of 20% below 2005 levels for international aviation and
maritime emissions this would lead to around 0.5Gt of additional mitigation (if any offsets that
were purchased were additional to current targets developed countries).
48GtCO2e
44GtCO2e
40GtCO2e
Annex 1: Defining 2020 emissions for a 2°C goal.18
Trajectories that have a reasonable chance of keeping temperature rise
to below 2°C
There are numerous trajectories that achieve similar climate outcomes. Since
it is cumulative emissions over time that matter most, less early action means
sharper reductions to low emission levels in the future. There are paths with
emissions below 40Gt in 2020 that are consistent with 2°C but are ignored as
they require global reduction above 2% per annum on average from 2010 to
2020, which is not considered credible given existing structures of production.
Trajectories nearer the top of the range in 2020 have to be near the bottom of
the 2050 range and vice versa.
Figure 1: Trajectories that give a reasonable chance of temperature rise
below 2°C19
Climate responsible trajectories
A “climate responsible” trajectory is one that has a reasonable chance of
avoiding expected temperature increases of more than 2°C, without entailing
excessive costs or risks. Current leaders and policy makers are responsible
for making a credible start on this trajectory, laying the foundations for greater
reductions in the future while not missing low-cost opportunities and not
passing much greater costs to future generations. The key points that define a
trajectory and hence “climate responsibility” are:
• Emission peak – the sooner and lower the peak in emissions, the smaller
the reductions that are required in the future. But it takes time to build the
18 For more see: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/granthamInstitute/pdf/bowenRangerPolicyBrief.pdf
19 These results are based on the Hadley Centre climate model MAGICC. There are some key uncertainties. The
majority of this uncertainty is in the response of the Earth’s system to human GHG emissions and comes from the
carbon-cycle feedback, with a smaller contribution from climate sensitivity. This uncertainty, of the order of +5 to
-10 Gt (skewed to negative) or more, suggests the need for lower targets to maintain the option to revise
downwards if new science warrants stronger action. For 2050, around ±4GtCO2e uncertainty is estimated around
the emissions projections themselves due to, in particular, the aerosol emissions and abatement options among
different gases. Under a low aerosol scenario emissions must be well below 48Gt with very rapid declines. These
trajectories give a 50% probability of 2°C.
domestic political consensus on how to act and implement the required
policies and investments to achieve rapid reductions.
• Annual rate of decline – the faster the rate of reductions, the greater the
overall costs, as it requires a more rapid deployment of new low-carbon
technologies, early retirement of existing assets and a larger impact on
energy prices.
• How low emissions go beyond 2050 – achieving very low levels beyond
2050 relies more heavily on technologies to decarbonise to very low levels
in all sectors, which may not be feasible and is potentially much more
expensive.
Implications for 2020 emissions
Feasible trajectories for keeping a reasonable chance of temperature
increases below 2°C requires emissions to be between 40-48Gt in 2020. As
set out in their research this findings is consistent with the analysis that
underpinned the IPCC conclusions. A later and higher peak in global annual
emissions will mean fewer options subsequently and relying on the rapid
emergence of technologies to drive very rapid emission reductions over the
longer term, with more ‘stranded assets’. This is a higher risk and higher cost
strategy as lower-cost near-term options are missed and greater reductions
are required in the longer term. 44Gt in 2020 requires global annual
reductions of around 3.3% each year after 2020 and annual emissions of
around 16Gt in 2050, which is plausible but still ambitious. The 44GtCO2e in
2020 path demonstrates the most appropriate balance of risks and
opportunities. It encapsulates the economic benefits of early action, while
leaving time between now and 2020 for policies to take effect.
There is some flexibility in the date by which emissions must peak, but a later
peak must be compensated for by more rapid reductions thereafter. With
levels above 48GtCO2e in 2020, we estimate that the world would need to
reduce annual emissions at an average rate of more than 4% per year
between 2020 and 2050, to below 14 GtCO2e in 2050, which would be
considerably more expensive than earlier action.
Evidence shows that delays in participation in a global climate change policy
regime are likely to increase the costs of hitting the target significantly, without
benefiting the late adopters, and may make the target unattainable. Limiting
the rise in global temperatures to a 2°C ceiling above pre-industrial levels is
demanding. But, with well-designed policies applied consistently across
countries, industries and greenhouse gases, modelling exercises suggest it
can be reached and need not cost more than a few percentage points of GDP,
against a backdrop of continued strong economic growth. We should not see
the route to the low-carbon economy merely or mostly in terms of cost and
burden-sharing. These are innovations, investments and opportunities: green
technologies could create the most dynamic and innovative period in
economic history with many benefits (e.g. energy security, safety, biodiversity)
beyond the fundamental one of managing climate change
Copenhagen
Nicholas Stern
6th December 2009
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy
Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and
the Environment
In collaboration with the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Policy Update
The Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy (CCCEP) was
established by the University of Leeds and the London School of Economics
and Political Science in 2008 to advance public and private action on climate
change through innovative, rigorous research. The Centre is funded by the UK
Economic and Social Research Council and has five inter-linked research
programmes:
1. Developing climate science and economics
2. Climate change governance for a new global deal
3. Adaptation to climate change and human development
4. Governments, markets and climate change mitigation
5. The Munich Re Programme - Evaluating the economics of climate risks
and opportunities in the insurance sector
More information about the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy
can be found at: http://www.cccep.ac.uk.
The Grantham Research Institute for Climate Change and the
Environment was established by the London School of Economics and
Political Science in 2008 to bring together international expertise on
economics, finance, geography, the environment, international development
and political economy to create a world-leading centre for policy-relevant
research and training in climate change and the environment. The Institute is
funded by The Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment.,
and has five research programmes:
1. Use of climate science in decision-making
2. Mitigation of climate change (including the roles of carbon markets and
low-carbon technologies)
3. Impacts of, and adaptation to, climate change, and its effects on
development
4. Governance of climate change
5. Management of forests and ecosystems
More information about the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change
and the Environment can be found at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/grantham/.
Action and Ambition for a Global Deal in Copenhagen1
Summary:
This paper sets out an assessment of the latest national positions regarding
emission reduction targets and actions going into the forthcoming negotiations
in Copenhagen. These targets and intentions are quantified and translated
into global emissions to give an understanding of how close we are to a
possible agreement consistent with keeping temperature increase below 2°C.
Recent work on the latest science and economics of 2°C shows that global
emissions should be around 44Gt2 carbon dioxide equivalents in 2020 to be
consistent with a 50-50 chance of keeping temperature increase below 2°C.
This is in line with the earlier work that underpins the IPCC conclusions.
Existing proposals from developed and developing countries, if delivered,
constitute a big step towards a path consistent with the 2°C goal. Taking
countries’ highest intentions would take the world to around 46Gt in 2020 a
gap of 2Gt, which may be around 80% of the way from business as usual,
depending on the interpretation of business as usual.
However, this analysis relies on the following key assumptions:
• Countries moving to or standing by their high intentions which may require
the satisfaction of stipulated conditions concerning action from others
• Providing adequate finance and other support for high intentions in
developing countries such as Indonesia and Brazil; this should not count
offset finance, as this risks double counting, or with offset finance but
matched with more stringent targets.
• That surplus emissions allowances from previous commitment periods do
not weaken mitigation effort
• A system of rules for how to account for the emissions released and
absorbed in the LULUCF sector (Land Use, Land Use Change and
Forestry) to ensure the environmental integrity of emission targets
But with the right kind of collaborative spirit it is clearly possible for countries
to get to together so that the necessary strong commitments can be made.
Analysing these intentions often relies on relating targets and actions to a
concept of business as usual (BAU). BAU is a concept that is difficult to pin
down because a group of polices that have been indicated or announced may
or may not be included in BAU; further it can depend on what assumptions are
made about structural change, for example how rapidly services grow as a
share of the economy. Where an analyst uses a higher estimate of business
as usual this can lead to a larger estimated gap. It also depends on what is
included in these estimates and with significant uncertainty around current
and future non-energy emissions there is scope for alternative estimates. We
1 This is a work in progress incorporating announcements as of 4th December and subject to
revision as many country plans are under review and could to change or be clarified, so this
assessment will be subject to change. The interpretation of the targets are the authors. Many
thanks to Chris Taylor and colleagues at the Grantham Research Institute, LSE and at UNEP
for their helpful comments and guidance. Comments are very welcome.
2 Gigatonne - which is a billion tonnes
suggest an uncertainty range of around -1Gt to +3Gt3 around our estimate of
the gap.
On the basis of the above calculations the gap would be 2Gt (range from 1Gt
to 5Gt). Filling the remaining 2Gt gap would require greater ambition
(especially from larger emitters in order to deliver required reductions), ideally
combined with a contribution to emission reductions from international aviation
and maritime sectors which is currently excluded from existing commitments,
and greater efforts on REDD.
While there is much to do, we should not downplay how close we are to
delivering an effective and credible global agreement.
What is a ‘climate responsible’ trajectory?
Research4 by the LSE Grantham Research Institute explored a range of
trajectories that result in a reasonable chance of keeping temperature
increases below 2°C and considered the economic implications. Annex 1
provides a more detailed summary. The scientific conclusions are consistent
with the ranges in the IPCC. Since it is cumulative emissions over time that
matter most to eventual temperature increase, less early action means more
costly and sharper reductions to lower emission levels in the future.
The analysis concludes that emissions should be around 44Gt in 2020,
representing a sensible “climate responsible” target from a cost and risk
management perspective5. Lower emissions would also be consistent with
2°C but require very strong action over the next decade. Higher emissions
could still reach the same climate outcomes but require more drastic action
after 2020 that would be considerably more expensive and may not be
feasible. Current emissions are around 47Gt in 2010 (this would be close to
50Gt if it were not for the slowdown).
But how do current intentions collectively compare to 44Gt in 2020? The next
section outlines and quantifies the commitments, targets, proposals and
intentions of the major emitters6. It does not cover the plans for other
countries although many of them are ambitious relative to their size such as
Norway’s commitment to reduce emissions by 40% on 1990 levels and the
Maldives pledge to be carbon neutral by 2019.
3 This range is skewed to reflect the fact that we are unable to include peat emissions which
could currently be around 1Gt to 1.5Gt. Other studies evaluating current intentions can be
found at http://www.climateactiontracker.org/ and http://www.project-catalyst.info/
4 Paper released on 1st December by Dr Ranger and Dr Bowen on the Grantham Research
Institute website.http://www2.lse.ac.uk/granthamInstitute/pdf/bowenRangerPolicyBrief.pdf
5 There is not as yet wide political agreement that such a level is an appropriate benchmark
for a 2°C trajectory. However, in our view this represents an appropriate level for this analysis.
6 At the time of writing the countries in the more detailed tables are all in the top 20 carbon
dioxide emitters and collectively account for more than 80% of global emissions Emission
commitments excluded from the detailed tables are included in the overall numbers for
developed countries..
Current developed country proposals
Table 1: Annex I - developed countries
Country Description Summary for
2020 emissions
US Recent announcement that the US is prepared to table
an emissions commitment of 17% below 2005 levels
(3% below 19907). Longer-term goals set out a pathway
to an 83% below 2005 levels (80% reduction below
1990 levels) in 2050. Earlier draft legislation had
additional provisions to buy 0.7Gt of forestry credits in
2020 and around $3bn for technology and adaptation.
Currently emissions are 15% above 1990 levels.
3% below 1990
levels
Plus support for
reduced
deforestation?
EU Committed to reduce emissions to 20% below 1990
levels (currently 12.5% below) and 30% below 1990
levels as part of an ambitious global agreement.
Indicated willingness to pay its share of significant
finance flows from developed to developing countries
including public finance that could support additional
mitigation (including REDD).
20 to 30% below
1990 levels.
Public finance for
additional
mitigation
elsewhere
Japan Japan has committed to reduce emissions by 25%
below 1990 levels as part of an effective and
comprehensive agreement at COP 15.
25% below 1990
levels
Russian
Federation
Russian Federation committed to reduce emissions by
up to 25% below 1990 levels. Russian emissions were
36% below 1990 levels in 2007.
25% below 1990
levels
Canada Committed to reduce emissions by 20% relative to 2006
levels (equivalent to 3% below 1990)
3% below 1990
levels
Australia Australia proposed to reduce its emissions to 5-25%
below 2000 levels (15% to 33% below 1990 levels).
Adoption of the most ambitious target of 25% depends
on five conditions being met8. If not all the conditions are
met but there is an international agreement with all
major emitters the target would be -15%.
15% to 33%
below 1990
levels
Based on authors understanding of existing positions
Some of the intentions have not yet been legislated as national commitments
or action plans and others are reliant on particular conditions being met (e.g.
on international agreement). Direct quantification of developed country targets
is often straightforward as they are related to fixed historical emissions levels
(although they tend to get complicated over how emissions and emissions
reductions in land use change, afforestation, reforestation and land
degradation will affect the target and the degree to which it is intended that
international offset credits play a role).
For Tables 1 and 2 we have used emissions excluding LULUCF. In 2005
UNFCCC data suggests that Annex I countries provided a net sink of around
1.8Gt which would further reduce emissions so excluding it from this analysis
7 The 3% figure is based on a 17% reduction of emissions excluding LULUCF. The target was
announced based on emissions including LULUCF which would be 5.5% on 1990 emission
including LULUCF. Depending on the accounting rules this is could be equivalent to about a
5% reduction on 1990 emission excluding LULUCF.
8 http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/australia010609.pdf reductions on 1990
levels based on recently revised UNFCCC 1990 data and including LULUCF in line with
Australian targets
ignores the potential additional contribution they could make. It is excluded as
its treatment is dependent in international rules which have yet to be
determined. If it is used to meet targets it could reduce mitigation effort from
other sources and possibly increasing emission levels beyond the totals in the
next table. The table also excludes the potential for surplus credits from
previous commitment periods being used to meet targets which, if permitted,
could increase emissions in 2020.
Table 2: Current developed country proposals in 2020 (Gt CO2e)
Low intentions
2020 Emissions
(Gt) High intentions
2020 Emissions
(Gt)
US -17% on 2005 5.9 -17% on 2005 5.9
EU -20% on 1990 4.5 -30% on 1990 3.9
Japan -25% on 1990 1.0 -25% on 1990 1.0
Other developed countries 5.1 5.0
Developed country total 16.3 15.7
So current proposals would take developed countries to around 16Gt (and a
significant deviation from business as usual) and around 16% below 1990
levels. It is not possible to determine whether such commitments are enough
to take the world onto a 44Gt pathway until it is combined with developing
country actions; and it would remain open to debate whether it represents an
equitable share of the mitigation effort.
Targets and actions announced by developing countries
Table 3: Non-Annex I - developing countries
Country Description 2020 Summary
China Announced policies such as the energy intensity
target in the current 5 year plan and 2020 targets
for renewable and nuclear are set to reduce
emissions by around 10% below business as
usual (BAU). Recent announcement to set
carbon intensity of output to 40% to 45% below
2005 levels by 2020.
Carbon intensity
target and
existing domestic
policies lead to a
10% reduction on
2020 BAU
India Plans and policies outlined in National Plan and
in the 11th 5 year plan. Many are not quantified
but domestic policy initiatives with policy targets
collectively amount to a deviation from BAU of at
least 7%. Recent announcement to set carbon
intensity of output to 20% to 25% below 2005
levels by 2020.
Carbon intensity
target and
existing domestic
policies lead to at
least 7%
reduction on
2020 BAU
Brazil Announced target reduce its emissions by 36%
to 39% on 2020 BAU levels (roughly 1/3 below
1990 levels) conditional on external financing
and including significant REDD. Level of finance
requirements not yet clear so not certain what is
own action and what requires support. Had
previously announced a National Action Plan
that would reduce emissions by about 25%
below BAU.
36% to 39%
below 2020 BAU
levels with
external financial
support
Indonesia Pledged to reduce emissions below BAU by 26%
unilaterally and 41% below with international
26% below 2020
BAU unilateral,
support (around 1/6 to 1/3 below 1990 levels).
The 26% target is to be achieved primarily
through reduced emissions from deforestation
and land use change.
41% below
conditional
South Korea Unilateral pledge to reduce emissions by 30%
below their defined BAU (around 4% below 2005
levels).
30% below 2020
BAU
South Africa Existing domestic policies expected to reduce
emissions by about 10% from BAU. Government
intention to follow a peak and decline scenario
which allows for the initial build-up of base-load
capacity, would equate to around 20% below
BAU levels.
10% below 2020
BAU
Mexico National plan (PECC) sets out detailed policies
up to 2012 that are being enacted which are
likely to reduce emission by around 5% in 2020
relative to BAU. Overall strategy to reduce
emissions by 50% by 2050 implies emission
being around 20% below BAU in 2020.
5% below 2020
BAU but longer
term goals imply
greater ambition
Note: Based on authors understanding of existing positions. Where countries have
announced both a set of policies and a carbon intensity (or other) reductions we have taken
the bigger of the two calculations in terms of reductions. This is of particular relevance to
China and India where the announced intensity targets appear to imply lower than the
reductions that would follow from announced policies (perhaps because there is some
inherent caution on the implementation of the policies).
Again some of the intentions have not yet been legislated as national targets
or action plans and others are reliant on certain conditions being met. This is
particularly the case for Indonesia and Brazil where delivering on the high
ambition targets is dependent on international support. As countries have
expanded their scale of ambition they are understandably looking again at
what support would be required. This highlights the importance of developed
countries delivering substantial financial resources to support the willingness
of some developing countries to implement ambitious policies.
Targets in developing countries pose additional challenges for quantification.
The targets are usually related to business as usual9 (BAU) – the path
emissions would be likely to follow without further policy action. Reductions
are therefore dependent on what assumptions are made about the BAU path.
This is easier where countries specify reductions against a specified BAU but
where they do not there can be significant variations in BAU estimates from
9 There remains considerable uncertainty around developing country emissions and, in
particular those relating to forestry and land use. The uncertainty in developed country BAU is
much lower as targets are generally related to fixed historical points. Developing countries
would commit to actions relative to a definition of business as usual. They would be
committing to actions not the emission levels set out in this numerical exercise so this would
introduce some uncertainty in climate outcomes were significant revisions in BAU to occur.
Moreover, business as usual is a slippery concept that is inherently subjective and subject to
significant uncertainties. What actions and commitments are included in BAU over time is
subjective. It is easier where countries have specified actions against a defined path but other
sources of estimates of BAU (largely the International Energy Agency) are used for our
calculations where this is not possible. It is better, given its subjectivity, to avoid using BAU
where possible. Indeed by combining growth rates, emissions per unit of output and
associated mitigation actions, BAU becomes redundant.
different sources. Higher BAU estimates due to stronger economic growth,
energy intensity or LULUCF sources would affect to estimates of emission
outcomes.
The quantification of reductions in this analysis is predicated on the support
provided action to reach higher targets (e.g. Brazil and Indonesia) being
accomplished through public finance from developed countries, not carbon
market offsets (which would count towards the developed country target) in
order to avoid double counting. Offsets by developed countries would shift the
balance of actual emissions and would imply finance flows to developing
countries. We must be transparent about ‘adding up’ and avoid double
counting, and thus estimate actual emissions after offsets; emissions in
country A which buys the offsets are increased relative to the numbers here
and emissions in country B which receives the finance flow are lowered (sells
the offset). Nevertheless offsets through the carbon market can be a win-win
for both developed and developing countries10.
As a first step Table 4 considers only India and China’s domestic policy
targets and assumes other developing countries follow a BAU trajectory.
Table 4: Developing country policies (China and India) and the expected
emission reductions11 See note for Table 3
Country Current policies
Savings in 2020
(GT CO2e)
Emissions in
2020 (GT CO2e)
Energy Intensity target 20% by 2010 0.5
Renewable energy 15% by 2020 0.5
Nuclear target 75GW by 2020 0.3
Total 11.2
Solar Mission 20GW by 2020 0.03
Renewable electricity 15% by 2020 0.07
Increasing forest cover 6 million hectares by 2017 0.07
Total 3.6
Other developing countries 16.7
International aviation and maritime 1.3
Total developing countries and international aviation and maritime 32.8
China
India
Carbon intensity targets pose additional challenges to quantification. Growth
rates are already a key determinant in BAU but directly affect the total
10 They can provide private finance to foster both the transformation of the energy system in
developing countries and the transfer of and domestic development of low-carbon
technologies; and they can reduce global mitigation costs.
11 Estimates in this table are sensitive to uncertainty in business as usual. These estimates
are based on assumptions on developing country forestry and energy emissions that are
subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Changes in these levels will affect the volume of
emission reductions that would need to be delivered. Anthropogenic emissions from peat are
excluded and incorporating these would add up to 1.5Gt globally. This would provide an
additional argument to go further in mitigation action including specific action to reduce
emissions from peat to take advantage of these additional mitigation opportunities. Recent
revisions in deforestation estimates may offset incorporating peat emissions to an extent.
There should also be increased efforts to clarify current and hence likely future emissions to
reduce this uncertainty.
emissions implied by carbon intensity targets. In this analysis it was assumed
that China continued strong economic growth of over 8% but that existing
domestic policies (emissions intensity target up to 2010 and 2020 nuclear and
renewable targets) led to significant emission reductions on BAU. Our
analysis suggests this leads to lower emissions than implied by the emission
intensity target and hence it is the domestic targets that ‘bite’12 for the purpose
of these calculations. The same also applies to India’s emission intensity
target.
The following graph provides estimates of some of the emission reductions
from some of the targets proposed recently by Indonesia, Brazil, and South
Korea along with those implicit in South African modelling13. Thus the
reductions are additional to those in Table 4. In the case of Brazil they reflect
a crude estimation of the share of the target that is “national effort” and the
share that is conditional on additional support14.
If these actions and targets were fully supported allowing Brazil and Indonesia
to go to the top end of their targets but without using offset finance (which
would lead to double counting) then they would deliver an additional 2.6Gt
mitigation relative to Table 4 taking the other developing countries down to
14.2Gt and the total developing country emissions to 28.9Gt.
12 This would imply China did not abandon or loosen existing domestic policies and targets. If
economic growth was not as strong (i.e. below 6.5% per annum) then the emission intensity target
would start to reduce emissions further. If growth was significantly stronger than has been assumed
then this would push emissions up.
13 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS). Strategic Options for South Africa. Pretoria, South
Africa: Development of Environment Affaires and Tourism (2007)
14 As reflected by the graded shading and arrow in the figure below.
Where could these commitments, actions and targets take the world?
These tables show that all the major emitters have shown a willingness to
take significant action to reduce their emissions from business as usual
(BAU), whilst specific targets reflect a diverse range of national
circumstances. The intentions and actions embodied in Tables 2, 4 and from
recent developing country intentions are shown in Table 5 and show that high
intentions imply global emissions of just under 46Gt in 2020. This figure
is derived from the high end of the developed country commitments and
reductions achieved in developing countries with adequate international
financial support (if not using offset credits). The gap relative to 44Gt in 2020
would be around 2Gt15 (or a range of 1Gt to 5Gt). This already represents a
saving of around 8Gt on BAU16 so existing announcements would, if
delivered, achieve 80% of the reductions that are required.
Table 5: Total emissions from high intentions
2020 total from
high intentions
Developed country total 15.7Gt
Developing countries total 28.9Gt
International aviation and maritime 1.3Gt
Global total 46Gt
Gap 2Gt
However, these estimates rely on countries being satisfied that the conditions
are met for them to reach high targets and, in particular, adequate support
being provided to developing countries to facilitate their highest intentions.
Strong financial and technical support is essential to deliver these
targets. Furthermore it assumes that double counting through offsets is
avoided and that there is no weakening of new targets through lax accounting
rules for the LULUCF or surplus emissions allowances from the Kyoto period.
Failure on these, or countries resorting to low intentions has the potential to
significantly reduce the overall level of ambition calculated here. Clearly there
are significant challenges involved in delivering such reductions but none of
these are insurmountable and the required reductions could probably be
achieved using current technologies and carefully designed policies.
Technological progress would open up a further range of options.
Filling the gap
There are many ways in which the remaining gap could be filled and it is
essentially a political question to be addressed by countries during the
upcoming COP negotiations. The main options include some combination of:
• Developed countries increasing their high intentions.
• Other developing countries, especially larger emitters (given their size),
coming forward with plans for further domestic reductions as part of a
15 Or 3.5Gt if anthropogenic peat emissions continue at current levels to 2020
16 Our business as usual (excluding peat) is 54Gt in 2020
global deal and/or an indication of what they could do with international
support.
• Additional reductions in deforestation and other sources
• Incorporating international emissions from aviation and maritime to
deliver additional mitigation17.
Conclusions
This analysis shows that existing developed and developing country targets
and plans can take us most of the way to global emissions of 44Gt in 2020,
which is consistent with a 2°C trajectory. This assumes that developed
countries provide finance to support mitigation in developing countries that is
not counted as an offset against their mitigation goals (or represents part of
more ambitious goals). It shows that agreeing actions consistent with a 2°C
trajectory is feasible in Copenhagen.
This analysis relies on two key assumptions if such a positive vision is to
come to fruition. First it assumes that countries are at least able to fully deliver
on their stated high intentions and that some of them increase their intentions
further. Given that many of these intentions are already ambitious the effort
required to deliver should not be understated. Starting strongly on a lowcarbon
path is surely justified relative to the dire consequences of the
alternative, but requires a radical restructuring of how our economies work in
the coming decades. Secondly it requires countries to come together and
agree to deliver on their intentions and provide the appropriate support to
each other to ensure that in Copenhagen we enshrine these intentions as part
of an international agreement.
Uncertainty in business as usual (BAU) could lead to larger estimates of the
‘gap’ if a higher BAU is included or estimates from peat and other LULUCF
sources are thought to be higher. This leads us to suggest a range for the gap
of 1Gt to 5Gt.
The countries of the world have made considerable progress towards
securing a global agreement that delivers emission reductions which are
commensurate with the scale of the challenge. All of the major economies
understand that every country must act. We must now work together to
cement and increase the indicative ambition shown thus far and turn this into
a solid set of actions and commitments that will fill the gap and deliver the
scale of reductions that are required to keep the temperature increase to
below 2°C. The people and politicians of the world, community by community,
nation by nation, will now determine whether we can create and sustain the
international vision, commitment and collaboration which will allow us to seize
this historic special opportunity and to rise to the challenge of a planet in peril.
17 For example, if we set a target of 20% below 2005 levels for international aviation and
maritime emissions this would lead to around 0.5Gt of additional mitigation (if any offsets that
were purchased were additional to current targets developed countries).
48GtCO2e
44GtCO2e
40GtCO2e
Annex 1: Defining 2020 emissions for a 2°C goal.18
Trajectories that have a reasonable chance of keeping temperature rise
to below 2°C
There are numerous trajectories that achieve similar climate outcomes. Since
it is cumulative emissions over time that matter most, less early action means
sharper reductions to low emission levels in the future. There are paths with
emissions below 40Gt in 2020 that are consistent with 2°C but are ignored as
they require global reduction above 2% per annum on average from 2010 to
2020, which is not considered credible given existing structures of production.
Trajectories nearer the top of the range in 2020 have to be near the bottom of
the 2050 range and vice versa.
Figure 1: Trajectories that give a reasonable chance of temperature rise
below 2°C19
Climate responsible trajectories
A “climate responsible” trajectory is one that has a reasonable chance of
avoiding expected temperature increases of more than 2°C, without entailing
excessive costs or risks. Current leaders and policy makers are responsible
for making a credible start on this trajectory, laying the foundations for greater
reductions in the future while not missing low-cost opportunities and not
passing much greater costs to future generations. The key points that define a
trajectory and hence “climate responsibility” are:
• Emission peak – the sooner and lower the peak in emissions, the smaller
the reductions that are required in the future. But it takes time to build the
18 For more see: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/granthamInstitute/pdf/bowenRangerPolicyBrief.pdf
19 These results are based on the Hadley Centre climate model MAGICC. There are some key uncertainties. The
majority of this uncertainty is in the response of the Earth’s system to human GHG emissions and comes from the
carbon-cycle feedback, with a smaller contribution from climate sensitivity. This uncertainty, of the order of +5 to
-10 Gt (skewed to negative) or more, suggests the need for lower targets to maintain the option to revise
downwards if new science warrants stronger action. For 2050, around ±4GtCO2e uncertainty is estimated around
the emissions projections themselves due to, in particular, the aerosol emissions and abatement options among
different gases. Under a low aerosol scenario emissions must be well below 48Gt with very rapid declines. These
trajectories give a 50% probability of 2°C.
domestic political consensus on how to act and implement the required
policies and investments to achieve rapid reductions.
• Annual rate of decline – the faster the rate of reductions, the greater the
overall costs, as it requires a more rapid deployment of new low-carbon
technologies, early retirement of existing assets and a larger impact on
energy prices.
• How low emissions go beyond 2050 – achieving very low levels beyond
2050 relies more heavily on technologies to decarbonise to very low levels
in all sectors, which may not be feasible and is potentially much more
expensive.
Implications for 2020 emissions
Feasible trajectories for keeping a reasonable chance of temperature
increases below 2°C requires emissions to be between 40-48Gt in 2020. As
set out in their research this findings is consistent with the analysis that
underpinned the IPCC conclusions. A later and higher peak in global annual
emissions will mean fewer options subsequently and relying on the rapid
emergence of technologies to drive very rapid emission reductions over the
longer term, with more ‘stranded assets’. This is a higher risk and higher cost
strategy as lower-cost near-term options are missed and greater reductions
are required in the longer term. 44Gt in 2020 requires global annual
reductions of around 3.3% each year after 2020 and annual emissions of
around 16Gt in 2050, which is plausible but still ambitious. The 44GtCO2e in
2020 path demonstrates the most appropriate balance of risks and
opportunities. It encapsulates the economic benefits of early action, while
leaving time between now and 2020 for policies to take effect.
There is some flexibility in the date by which emissions must peak, but a later
peak must be compensated for by more rapid reductions thereafter. With
levels above 48GtCO2e in 2020, we estimate that the world would need to
reduce annual emissions at an average rate of more than 4% per year
between 2020 and 2050, to below 14 GtCO2e in 2050, which would be
considerably more expensive than earlier action.
Evidence shows that delays in participation in a global climate change policy
regime are likely to increase the costs of hitting the target significantly, without
benefiting the late adopters, and may make the target unattainable. Limiting
the rise in global temperatures to a 2°C ceiling above pre-industrial levels is
demanding. But, with well-designed policies applied consistently across
countries, industries and greenhouse gases, modelling exercises suggest it
can be reached and need not cost more than a few percentage points of GDP,
against a backdrop of continued strong economic growth. We should not see
the route to the low-carbon economy merely or mostly in terms of cost and
burden-sharing. These are innovations, investments and opportunities: green
technologies could create the most dynamic and innovative period in
economic history with many benefits (e.g. energy security, safety, biodiversity)
beyond the fundamental one of managing climate change
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Prentice doubtful on climate change accord in Copenhagen
Less than two months from key global climate change talks, federal Environment Minister Jim Prentice said he doubts whether an agreement will be hammered out in Copenhagen.
"Increasingly people are being realistic, that it's hard to see a full and complete agreement being arrived at," Prentice told the Calgary Herald editorial board Wednesday.
"There's probably too much work to be done in the time left to achieve that," Prentice said.
U. S. President Barack Obama's administration is now working on alternative bilateral agreements with countries such as India and China with the intention of reviving a process that appears increasingly deadlocked between developing countries and advanced economies.
Prentice said the Copenhagen meeting is still important, but "it's more likely we'll be working toward some agreed principles."
Regardless, the minister said Canada will go ahead with its own plan of reducing climate changing emissions by 20 per cent below 2006 levels by 2020 --and each province will individually have to live up to that target, including Alberta.
"There will have to be a parity of effort across the country," Prentice said.
"We're all in this together. If that's going to be Canada's national target, then each province is going to have to share their share of the burden."
Prentice added the caveat that specific agreements have not been worked out between Ottawa and the provinces.
But there's no doubt the federal government has more ambitious targets than Alberta. The Stelmach government's plan allows for absolute increases in emissions until 2020.
While a difference in greenhouse strategies has been a source of contention between the Alberta and Ottawa, provincial Environment Minister Rob Renner appeared unfazed by Prentice's comments.
"It's a very complex discussion," Renner said. "I'm comfortable that we will have a unified position when we get to Copenhagen."
Renner added the province hasn't shied away from being proactive in making CO2 reduction targets -- based on how much industries produce rather than absolute caps on emissions. But he added that more ambitious targets are possible.
Alberta's "legislated reductions are relatively modest," Renner acknowledged. "Once everybody else comes on board, there's no reason to believe that we can't increase the effort . . . but we can't do it now because it would put us out of sync with everyone else and it would make our industry totally uncompetitive."
Environmental groups have long been worried that whatever strategy the Harper government rolls out for regulating industry emissions, it will allow for Alberta's oilsands to grow unfettered.
"A credible cap and trade system should not include loopholes or special treatment for sectors and provinces," said Clare Demerse of the Pembina Institute.
"The treatment of Alberta, and particularly of the oilsands sector, will be a key litmus test for whatever plan the federal government releases this fall. That's because the oilsands are the largest source of the growth in Canada's emissions," Demerse said.
Prentice said negotiations leading up to Copenhagen have proved difficult.
Alleviating poverty is a bigger priority than reducing emissions for less-wealthy countries. "They make a compelling argument," Prentice said.
Canada's position is to replace the Kyoto accord with a new agreement.
In that vein, Prentice also commented on a controversy as to whether developing countries walked out as Canadian representatives spoke in Bangkok earlier this month.
The minister said that didn't happen; those countries chose not to participate in the technical discussion
"Increasingly people are being realistic, that it's hard to see a full and complete agreement being arrived at," Prentice told the Calgary Herald editorial board Wednesday.
"There's probably too much work to be done in the time left to achieve that," Prentice said.
U. S. President Barack Obama's administration is now working on alternative bilateral agreements with countries such as India and China with the intention of reviving a process that appears increasingly deadlocked between developing countries and advanced economies.
Prentice said the Copenhagen meeting is still important, but "it's more likely we'll be working toward some agreed principles."
Regardless, the minister said Canada will go ahead with its own plan of reducing climate changing emissions by 20 per cent below 2006 levels by 2020 --and each province will individually have to live up to that target, including Alberta.
"There will have to be a parity of effort across the country," Prentice said.
"We're all in this together. If that's going to be Canada's national target, then each province is going to have to share their share of the burden."
Prentice added the caveat that specific agreements have not been worked out between Ottawa and the provinces.
But there's no doubt the federal government has more ambitious targets than Alberta. The Stelmach government's plan allows for absolute increases in emissions until 2020.
While a difference in greenhouse strategies has been a source of contention between the Alberta and Ottawa, provincial Environment Minister Rob Renner appeared unfazed by Prentice's comments.
"It's a very complex discussion," Renner said. "I'm comfortable that we will have a unified position when we get to Copenhagen."
Renner added the province hasn't shied away from being proactive in making CO2 reduction targets -- based on how much industries produce rather than absolute caps on emissions. But he added that more ambitious targets are possible.
Alberta's "legislated reductions are relatively modest," Renner acknowledged. "Once everybody else comes on board, there's no reason to believe that we can't increase the effort . . . but we can't do it now because it would put us out of sync with everyone else and it would make our industry totally uncompetitive."
Environmental groups have long been worried that whatever strategy the Harper government rolls out for regulating industry emissions, it will allow for Alberta's oilsands to grow unfettered.
"A credible cap and trade system should not include loopholes or special treatment for sectors and provinces," said Clare Demerse of the Pembina Institute.
"The treatment of Alberta, and particularly of the oilsands sector, will be a key litmus test for whatever plan the federal government releases this fall. That's because the oilsands are the largest source of the growth in Canada's emissions," Demerse said.
Prentice said negotiations leading up to Copenhagen have proved difficult.
Alleviating poverty is a bigger priority than reducing emissions for less-wealthy countries. "They make a compelling argument," Prentice said.
Canada's position is to replace the Kyoto accord with a new agreement.
In that vein, Prentice also commented on a controversy as to whether developing countries walked out as Canadian representatives spoke in Bangkok earlier this month.
The minister said that didn't happen; those countries chose not to participate in the technical discussion
Hearings on Senate's climate change bill to begin soon
The US Senate Environment and Public Works Committee will begin 3 days of hearings on Oct. 27 on the global climate-change bill that its chairwoman, Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), and John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) introduced Sept. 30.
“Members of the committee and their staffs, along with the committee’s staff, have been working day and night since the bill was introduced, and we have made great progress,” she told reporters at a briefing. “Draft provisions of the chairman’s mark have been sent to the Environmental Protection Agency for analysis. We expect that to be completed in time for the hearings.”
Boxer said the hearings will begin with testimony from US Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chairman Jon Wellinghoff.
Witnesses for the two other hearings will be announced shortly, she said. “We will schedule a full committee markup as soon as possible after the hearings,” she said.
“Members of the committee and their staffs, along with the committee’s staff, have been working day and night since the bill was introduced, and we have made great progress,” she told reporters at a briefing. “Draft provisions of the chairman’s mark have been sent to the Environmental Protection Agency for analysis. We expect that to be completed in time for the hearings.”
Boxer said the hearings will begin with testimony from US Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chairman Jon Wellinghoff.
Witnesses for the two other hearings will be announced shortly, she said. “We will schedule a full committee markup as soon as possible after the hearings,” she said.
Boxer’s announcement came a day before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee’s second hearing on potential costs of a carbon cap-and-trade program, a component of both S. 1733, the Boxer-Kerry bill, and HR 2454, the measure cosponsored by Reps. Henry A. Waxman (D-Calif.) and Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), which the House approved by seven votes on June 26.
‘Radical transformation’
“As the Senate continues to consider ways to deal with the global environmental problem of climate change, much of the discussion centers around the overall costs and benefits of such a program,” committee chairman Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) said Oct. 14 as he opened the hearing. “Addressing the issue of climate change will require a radical transformation of our energy sector, so this committee will continue to take a great interest in this topic in the months ahead.”
The committee’s ranking minority member, Lisa Murkowski (R-Alas.), said it will be important to make certain climate change legislation does not endanger a domestic economic recovery. “The proposals before us will affect not only climate change, but every facet of our economy for decades to come,” she maintained. “It’s incredibly difficult to conduct a sensitive and comprehensive analysis of climate change bills, but it’s equally important to know how those bills might work and what they may cost.”
Four federal analysts testified at the hearing: Douglas W. Elmendorf, director of the Congressional Budget Office; Richard G. Newell, US Energy Information Administration administrator; Reid P. Harvey, a branch chief within the EPA’s climate economics division; and Larry Parker, of the Congressional Research Service.
‘Radical transformation’
“As the Senate continues to consider ways to deal with the global environmental problem of climate change, much of the discussion centers around the overall costs and benefits of such a program,” committee chairman Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) said Oct. 14 as he opened the hearing. “Addressing the issue of climate change will require a radical transformation of our energy sector, so this committee will continue to take a great interest in this topic in the months ahead.”
The committee’s ranking minority member, Lisa Murkowski (R-Alas.), said it will be important to make certain climate change legislation does not endanger a domestic economic recovery. “The proposals before us will affect not only climate change, but every facet of our economy for decades to come,” she maintained. “It’s incredibly difficult to conduct a sensitive and comprehensive analysis of climate change bills, but it’s equally important to know how those bills might work and what they may cost.”
Four federal analysts testified at the hearing: Douglas W. Elmendorf, director of the Congressional Budget Office; Richard G. Newell, US Energy Information Administration administrator; Reid P. Harvey, a branch chief within the EPA’s climate economics division; and Larry Parker, of the Congressional Research Service.
Addressing climate change could entail substantial costs domestically since the US accounts for roughly 20% of total global carbon dioxide emissions, Elmendorf said in his written testimony. “Achieving such reductions would probably involve transforming the US economy from one that runs on CO2-emitting fossil fuels to one that increasing relies on nuclear and renewable fuels, accomplishing substantial improvements in energy efficiency, or implementing the large-scale capture and storage of CO2 emissions,” he said.
Climate legislation also would permanently shift production and employment away from industries which produce carbon-based energy and energy-intensive goods and toward alternative energy sources, goods, and services, Elmendorf said. “While those shifts occurred, total employment would probably be reduced a little compared with what it would have been without a comparably stringent policy to reduce carbon emissions because labor markets would most likely not adjust as quickly as would the composition of demand for different outputs,” he indicated.
Aspects of HR 2454
Other witnesses discussed studies of HR 2454 since its passage. Newell said EIA found carbon capture and storage and other key technologies for reducing emissions face a variety of technical challenges and, in some cases, additional questions regarding their widespread deployment.
“EIA’s results also suggest that the free allocation of allowances to electricity and natural gas distributors significantly lowers direct impacts on consumer electricity and natural gas prices prior to 2025, when it starts to be phased out,” he continued. “While this result may serve goals related to regional and overall fairness of the program, the overall efficiency of the cap-and-trade program is reduced to the extent that the price signal that would encourage cost-effective changes by consumers in their use of electricity and natural gas is delayed.”
Climate legislation also would permanently shift production and employment away from industries which produce carbon-based energy and energy-intensive goods and toward alternative energy sources, goods, and services, Elmendorf said. “While those shifts occurred, total employment would probably be reduced a little compared with what it would have been without a comparably stringent policy to reduce carbon emissions because labor markets would most likely not adjust as quickly as would the composition of demand for different outputs,” he indicated.
Aspects of HR 2454
Other witnesses discussed studies of HR 2454 since its passage. Newell said EIA found carbon capture and storage and other key technologies for reducing emissions face a variety of technical challenges and, in some cases, additional questions regarding their widespread deployment.
“EIA’s results also suggest that the free allocation of allowances to electricity and natural gas distributors significantly lowers direct impacts on consumer electricity and natural gas prices prior to 2025, when it starts to be phased out,” he continued. “While this result may serve goals related to regional and overall fairness of the program, the overall efficiency of the cap-and-trade program is reduced to the extent that the price signal that would encourage cost-effective changes by consumers in their use of electricity and natural gas is delayed.”
Harvey said in his written testimony that EPA’s analysis of HR 2454 and related Senate bills indicates cumulative reductions over several decades affect overall costs more than a particular year’s cap level. “Because HR 2454 allows emissions allowances to be banked over time, its 2050 cap (an 83% reduction from 2005 levels by 2050) drives overall behavior and encourages banking in the early years of the cap-and-trade program,” he observed.
“In other words, just changing the 2020 cap alone does not have a significant effect on total costs if all else stays the same. Costs will be lower the sooner we start acting, but a national commitment to meeting these long-run emission targets is key,” Harvey said.
Parker said the ultimate costs of HR 2454 would be determined by the economic response to the bill’s technical challenges, that the distribution of allowance value (either through free allocations or auction revenue) would determine who bears much of the program’s costs, and that the availability of offsets, especially international allowances, will be significant.
“The interplay between nuclear power, renewables, natural gas, and coal-fired capacity with carbon capture and storage among the cases emphasizes the need for a low-carbon source of electric generating capacity in the mid-to-long term,” he continued. “A considerable amount of low-carbon generation will have to be built under HR 2454 to meet the reduction requirement.”
“In other words, just changing the 2020 cap alone does not have a significant effect on total costs if all else stays the same. Costs will be lower the sooner we start acting, but a national commitment to meeting these long-run emission targets is key,” Harvey said.
Parker said the ultimate costs of HR 2454 would be determined by the economic response to the bill’s technical challenges, that the distribution of allowance value (either through free allocations or auction revenue) would determine who bears much of the program’s costs, and that the availability of offsets, especially international allowances, will be significant.
“The interplay between nuclear power, renewables, natural gas, and coal-fired capacity with carbon capture and storage among the cases emphasizes the need for a low-carbon source of electric generating capacity in the mid-to-long term,” he continued. “A considerable amount of low-carbon generation will have to be built under HR 2454 to meet the reduction requirement.”
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